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This book addresses the venerable and vexing issues surrounding the problem of whether death can be a harm to the person who dies. This problem is an ancient one which was raised long ago by the early Greek philosopher Epicurus, who notoriously argued that death is at no time a harm to its ‘victim’ because before death there is no harm and after death there is no victim. Epicurus’ conclusion is conspicuously at odds with our pre-reflective – and in most cases our post-reflective – intuitions, and numerous strategies have therefore been proposed to refute or avoid it. How then are we to account for our intuition that death is not just an evil, but perhaps the worst evil that may befall us? This is the key issue that the author addresses. This book explores various alternative approaches to the puzzling issues surrounding Epicurus’ notorious argument and provides a defence of the intuitively plausible conclusion that death can indeed be a harm to the person who dies. This challenge to Epicurus’ argument is developed by way of a detailed exploration of the issues raised not only by Epicurus, but also by his many successors, who have responded variously to the challenging issues which Epicurus raised. This book is a valuable contribution to, and continuation of, a debate which has stimulated philosophical reflection for millennia.Dr. William Grey
