During his inauguration speech on November 19, 2009, the then Afghan President Karsai announced to welcome and to provide necessary help to all disenchanted compatriots who are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the Constitution. We invite dissatisfied compatriots, who are not directly linked to international terrorism, to return to their homeland. This bold political initiative is the foundation for the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP). Referencing DDR experiences from other countries and DDR programs in Afghanistan, the author examines the lessons learned that have been incorporated in the APRP. As in other countries, Afghanistan will be facing the challenges of reintegration for many years to come. This book continues with the examination of the strategic implications of reintegration in wartime. It becomes evident that reintegration should not be seen as the sole realm of counterinsurgency (COIN). By contrast, reintegration must be regarded as an essential, even supreme element in the development of political and military strategies. Reintegration may not be suitable for all future conflicts. Nevertheless, the assessment of the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of reintegration should not start when a conflict fought with military means is close to termination but rather as soon as possible after the initial outbreak of hostilities. If reintegration is launched in the midst of a conflict, all strategic leaders must be aware that this will likely have significant impact on their strategies. Finally, strategists should be aware that reintegration cannot replace the use or threat of violence. Reintegration is not a panacea for subduing the enemy without fighting, a concept which Sun Tzu defined as the acme of skill. The capability of the host country and the intervention forces to fight successfully and the perceptions of the people are often decisive in the insurgent’s willingness to reintegrate. Consequently