Wettbewerbsorientierte Managerentlohnung im F&E-Kontext: Eine oekonomische Analyse ausgewahlter Performancemasse

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Manuela Hirsch untersucht ausgehend von einem Duopolmodell moegliche strategische Wettbewerbseffekte von Delegation und performanceorientierter Entlohnungsvertragsgestaltung im F&E-Kontext.