Rings in Auctions: An Experimental Approach

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This book deals with experimental studies in economics. It investigates experimentally collusions in first-price auctions with private values. Since the main aim of the study is to see which mechanisms are used when the subjects may collude, the participants are allowed to communicate as long as they want, before they made their bids, but after they have known their private valuations. Moreover, the winner is allowed to make side payments to losing bidders. The subjects have to invent the mechanism they want to use by themselves. The theoretical possibilities are not explained to them. Four mechanisms have been observed. For each of them, we provide a game theoretical analysis and we compare the data with the theoretical prediction.