Recent Advances in Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games

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The articles in this volume collectively represent the latest advances in how
people think of social dilemma problems, how we may be able to enhance cooperation
and reduce free-riding in such problems and how we can extend the lessons learned
to a host of other similar issues facing us. We have learned, for instance, that a take

frame does not necessarily lead to lower cooperation compared to a give frame
but combining a take frame with fine-grained individual level feedback leads to
more extreme behavior in terms of both greater cooperation and greater free-riding.
We have also learned that a strategy based on payoff sampling may provide a more
parsimonious and less parameter dependent way of modelling behavior in common
pool resource extraction games. We find that people behave differently in social
dilemmas when making decisions of their own as opposed to deciding on behalf of
someone else.