Challenges of State-Building in Iraq: The Case of the Iraqi Army in Post-Saddam Era

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The book aims to answer the central question: What went wrong, more precisely, in the decision chain during the reconstruction of Iraq’s military institution? The holistic character of the approach is ensured through a series of background analyses.

Although most researches concluded already that Iraq’s reconstruction was a failure, answering the question implied the design of an appropriate research method and data collection/analysis, in order to frame particular characteristics of the reconstruction process. Despite the complexity of the topic and theoretical Security Sector Reform principles, which can hardly be applied to Iraq’s case, the thesis emphasizes on actors involved, their actions and connections between events, as part of a unique process.