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This book provides a critical assessment of Nick Bostrom’s simulation argument. The argument states that at least one of these statements must be true:
[P1] Almost all civilizations will not reach a posthuman stage.
[P2] Almost all posthuman civilizations will have no interest in creating ancestor simulations.
[P3] We are almost definitely living in a computer simulation.
I examine the soundness of Bostrom’s argument by questioning some of his premises. I then propose a few modifications that address the issues raised. Thereafter, I suggest that Bostrom is wrong to assign equal credence to each outcome. Instead, I argue that outcome [P1] should be given preference because it requires the least amount of speculation and additional assumptions.
Section 1 introduces key concepts and explains why the Simulation Argument is worth our philosophical attention. Section 2 evaluates the two key assumptions underlying Bostrom’s argument. Section 3 presents a formal mathematical exposition of the Simulation Argument. This section also discusses several problems with the argument and suggests how they can be overcome. Section 4 looks at each of the three outcomes and discusses how we should best interpret them. I conclude by agreeing with Bostrom that the simulation hypothesis, however unlikely, is fundamentally different from other well-known scepticism scenarios.
