Australia and the Suez Crisis 1950-1957 focuses on the evolution of Australian policy before, during and after the Suez Crisis. The central theme of the volume is how, in the development of the Australian policy response to that crisis, questions of identity became entangled with shifts in the relativities of national power.

The documents in this volume reveal the contending perspectives among officials in Canberra, London and Washington shaping the advice provided to the Menzies Government, and the considerable gap between Prime Minister Menzies and External Affairs Minister Richard R. G. Casey regarding the British approach. It includes a robust exchange of correspondence between Menzies and US President Dwight D. Eisenhower regarding US policy, the diplomatic handling of which fell largely to Casey; correspondence, minutes and records of conversation from a range of government departments; and discussions between senior Cabinet ministers, which provide new insights into the policymaking process.