When Conrad Crane retired from active duty to become a research professor,he never expected to become a modern Cassandra, fated to tell truth to powerwithout being heeded. After the world transformed on 9/11, he warned theArmy that it was not prepared to execute stability operations,counterinsurgency, and the eventual reconstruction of Iraq. Crane’s work attracted the attention of Generals David Petraeus and JamesMattis, and he soon found himself in charge of a team tasked with creatingthe groundbreaking Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5Counterinsurgency, the very counterinsurgency doctrine he had pleaded for. Aunique blend of traditional and modern theory, this manual would prove to beessential to the success of the Surge in Iraq that changed the course of thewar. Crane’s account of the creation and implementation of the manual addressesits many criticisms, details what went wrong in Iraq, and explains how the newdoctrine was never properly applied in Afghanistan. From the debates over thecontent to the ways it was used in the field, Cassandra in Oz covers lessons that should be gleaned fromyears of global war and displays the American military as a learningorganization at its best.