Eisenhower’s Nuclear Calculus in Europe: The Politics of IRBM Deployment in NATO Nations

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President Eisenhower’s reliance on atomic weapons created as many problems as he hoped to solve with his defense policy. He hoped to provide a sustainable defense strategy that allowed the United States to maintain its security requirements without creating an excessive economic burden. This defense strategy, known as the New Look, benefitted the U.S. Air Force due to the focus on strategic bombing. However ballistic missiles offered the capability to launch nuclear warheads into the Soviet Union without the risk of their being intercepted. In order to do this, the U.S. required European missile bases to deploy its Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, while efforts continued to develop U.S. based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

Deploying atomic missiles to Europe required balancing regional European concerns with U.S. domestic security priorities. In the wake of the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957, many in the U.S. feared Soviet missile capability. Getting ballistic missiles into Europe mitigated this domestic security issue but convincing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to agree to base missiles in their country raised issues concerning sovereignty, weapons control, and ran the risk of creating divisions in the NATO alliance.