The amount and complexity of software developed during the last few years has increased tremendously. In particular, programs are being used more and more in embedded systems (from car-brakes to plant-control). Many of these applications are safety-relevant, i.e. a malfunction of hardware or software can cause severe damage or loss. Tremendous risks are typically present in the area of aviation, (nuclear) power plants or (chemical) plant control. Here, even small problems can lead to thousands of casualties and huge financial losses. Large financial risks also exist when computer systems are used in the area of telecommunication (telephone, electronic commerce) or space exploration. Computer applications in this area are not only subject to safety considerations, but also security issues are important. All these systems must be designed and developed to guarantee high quality with respect to safety and security. Even in an industrial setting which is (or at least should be) aware of the high requirements in Software Engineering, many incidents occur. For example, the Warshaw Airbus crash, was caused by an incomplete requirements specification. Uncontrolled reuse of an Ariane 4 software module was the reason for the Ariane 5 disaster. Some recent incidents in the telecommunication area, like illegal \“cloning\” of smart-cards of D2GSM handies, or the extraction of (secret) passwords from German T-online users show that also in this area serious flaws can happen. Due to the inherent complexity of computer systems, most authors claim that only a rigorous application of formal methods in all stages of the software life cycle can ensure high quality of the software and lead to real safe and secure systems. In this paper, we will have a look, in how far automated theorem proving can contribute to a more widespread application of formal methods and their tools, and what automated theorem provers (ATPs) must provide in order to be useful.
