From September 2005 to August 2006, Major Walter Roberson served as executive officer of a military transition team (MiTT) assigned to 3rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division - at the time a tier-one unit that was operating on its own and had its own battlespace in the vicinity of Habbaniyah. Part of a MiTT that included a mix of soldiers from the Army Reserve and National Guard, as well as, later, some active duty Marines, Roberson - formerly of the 6th Ranger Training Battalion - realized early on that he “couldn’t treat them like I’d treat my Rangers back at home station.” Accordingly, he talks at length about his own team dynamics, the internal and external challenges he faced as the XO, and most importantly the impact that taking comparatively heavy casualties had on the MiTT. Seven Purple Hearts were awarded to MiTT members during their tour, said Roberson, and one member - the team’s medic - was killed in action. The majority of injuries, he explained, were from improvised explosive devices (IEDs). “Over the 10 months we were there, we made contact with 101 IEDs. We found 50 of them the hard way. The other 51 we found and reduced. All of us had been blown up and shot at.” Miraculously, though, Roberson himself was never wounded, even though, as he said, “They tried real hard to get me.” Other topics discussed in this interview include the critically important decision by the MiTT to live with their Iraqi battalion; how trust and good rapport are most effectively built between Iraqis and their American advisors; the types of operations the Iraqi battalion conducted; how proficient they were at a variety of tasks; and the obstacles they still had to overcome before being a completely self-sufficient military unit. Roberson said that one thing he had to “constantly harp on” with his Iraqis was “treating people … and prisoners with respect.” He also talks about the particularly frustrating transfer of authority process with the MiTT set to replace them and the fact that too many military personnel were too wedded to the FOBs and their shrimp dinners, their air conditioning and their Baskin-Robbins ice cream on demand. Roberson additionally explains why he thinks that trying to get Iraqis to accept NCOs on the American military model is a “waste of time, effort and energy” and also why being like “warrior-kings” whom “no one really messed with” wasn’t actually too bad of a gig.