During the planning and major combat operations phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Colonel Russell Thaden was the deputy G2 for V Corps. Responsible for “ensuring that the entire staff was updated on the current intelligence situation” and for providing the “common picture of the enemy situation” Thaden also played a role in “target selection and nomination during the fight.” In this interview, he also discusses the quality and limitations of the intel available to coalition forces, the lack of success in finding weapons of mass destruction and individual high-value targets, and how intelligence gathering can be improved to allow soldiers to “shift from tracking tank battalions … to very amorphous insurgent groups.” After OIF, Thaden rejoined his NATO Joint Headquarters Center, which had been alerted for deployment to Afghanistan to take over the International Security Assistance Force mission on behalf of NATO. As chief J2, he directed the planning for the intelligence portion and was responsible for all NATO intelligence operations in the Kabul area and, later, for four northeastern provinces. From August 2003 to February 2004, Thaden was, “in effect, the commander of the Americans in theater for ISAF.” From extensive experience, he discusses counterinsurgency operations at great length. “With all the technical prowess the United States has and rightfully uses,” Thaden observes, “in the end, if you get focused on technical means as your silver bullet, you’re in deep trouble. Because as we found in Afghanistan and in Iraq, even if they can’t fight toe-to-toe with us in a conventional fight successfully - and they can’t - these are smart, dedicated folks. They are willing to kill and willing to die for their cause; and folks who have that mindset are not ones that a technical silver bullet exists to solve.”
