This paper seeks to understand why NATO’s success in Kosovo was mixed even by the most favorable evaluation. By focusing on the cultures involved in the conflict, it attempts to show that a lack of understanding of the Serbs and an inconsistent U.S. foreign policy leading up to the conflict may have resulted in not achieving U.S. and NATO objectives effectively. Knowing that there were key differences in the Serb’s view of Kosovo as opposed to other Former Republics of Yugoslavia may have altered the approach and achieved a more favorable outcome. Additionally, the situation provides evidence that a determined foreign policy backed by reasonable and consistent action may provide a better palette for successful negotiations. The research used studies of Milosevic, opinions expressed during the campaign and post conflict analysis. It consisted of mostly secondary sources of expert opinion and attempted to find common threats. Of particular interest was the impact on the Serb’s nationalistic identity and resolve and the impact of U.S. actions on their will regarding Kosovo.