As demonstrated by the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, achieving favorable war termination requires more than defeating the enemy on the battlefield. Across the U.S. government, agencies have recognized the requirement to develop capabilities that address the myriad of tasks found during combat and post-conflict environments. This monograph proposes that the current U.S. approach to war termination is inadequate. Problems surrounding favorably concluding hostilities are complex. Strategic aims will shift and evolve requiring an adaptive and learning organizational structure that can effectively employ the capabilities found across the whole of government. The case studies of Philippines in the early 20th century and Germany during WWII demonstrate the value of military governance to translate battlefield victory into political success. To achieve the national strategic aims, the constantly changing environment necessitated that military commanders possess the ability to influence local circumstances by integrating the instruments of national power within a single entity. Unity of command replaces the notion of unity of effort allowing for the necessary authorities and resources to address the realities in theater while remaining nested with the national political goals.