This monograph analyzes whether major combat operations or stability operations should be more of a priority for United States Army general purpose forces given the likely future threat, future operating environment, requirements and resources. Title X of the Congressional Code tasks the Army to prepare to accomplish any national objective. It goes on to prioritize those objectives in paragraph 206.2.b which reads, in general, the Army… is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and.. it will be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. Policy documents such as the National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 expand the Army’s core tasks from its Title X responsibilities to include stability operations as an equal priority for army preparedness. Army doctrine codifies these priorities in Field Manual 3-0: Operations, and in its operational construct, full spectrum operations. The thesis of this monograph argues that maintaining proficiency in major combat operations is more important to the Army’s general purpose forces than sustaining proficiency in stability operations. In support of this thesis the monograph begins with a review of the environment. This review includes an analysis and definition of common terms such as major combat operations and stability operations. It also includes a discussion of likely threats and the future common operating environment. The environmental section finishes with an analysis of the current state of Army combat skills. The problem section of the monograph portrays the existing gap between the requirements expressed in the Congressional Code and policy documents when analyzed against the current plan, the Army Force Generation Model, to resource those requirements. This section concludes with a short case study of