This is the first volume dedicated to suspension of judgment. It features cutting-edge research from leading scholars on one of the main areas of contemporary epistemology and neighbouring fields. The contributors examine the concept of suspension from various perspectives, encompassing historical and contemporary approaches, its nature and normativity, and its relationship to other philosophical concepts as well as interdisciplinary applications. They address a wide range of crucial issues, including but not limited to:

What is the nature of suspension? Can we suspend judgment voluntarily? Is there more than one kind of suspension? What are the norms for suspension? What is the relation between epistemic and prudential norms for suspension? What is the logic of suspension and how can we formally represent different forms of suspension? What is the role of suspension for rational decision? What is the relation of suspension of judgment and abstention of action? What is the relation between suspension and inquiry? How does suspension relate to doubt, ignorance, and indecision? How does the Pyrrhonian notion of suspension of judgment relate to modern accounts?

Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy.