The recent declassification of top secret Vietnam War papers of the Johnson administration provides an unusually intimate portrait of presidential decision making and fills an important gap in the literature on presidents and on the Vietnam War. For years, the Pentagon Papers served as the most influential published collection of Vietnam-era policy making documents. However, as Vietnam scholar George McT. Kahin has written, the Pentagon Papers are generally very sketchy and inadequate with respect to the political dimension; and for the critical years, 1964-1968, the gaps are particularly extensive.

Drawing upon the newly declassified documents and many other Vietnam papers, David Barrett’s Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam Papers fills the need for a one-volume collection detailing interaction and confrontations concerning the dilemmas of Vietnam policy.

He chronologically presents notes of meetings and phone calls between President Johnson and advisers, as well as meetings with some war critics; memoranda to and from the president; and notes and letters written by friends and associates of Johnson describing his thinking and concerns about the war.

This volume offers a first-hand documentation of how and why the United States fought in Indochina in the 1960s; an introduction to the archival holdings for future researchers; and

documentary evidence of the major players and their roles in making policy.