Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918

This analysis of British war policy considers alterations to the grand strategy during the last years of World War I. The argument is that war policy in this period was strongly affected by pessimism, even defeatism. In the aftermath of the defeats and disappointments of 1917, many could understand how the war could be lost, less how victory could be achieved. By the end of 1917, war policy had been revised so that it aimed less to win the war outright than to bring Germany to the conference table in a less exultant mood, whilst laying the bases for a peripheral war, essentially victorious on the continent, either in the last stages of World War I or during the ancicipated World War II. The major feature of this revised policy was that the focus of the war was to be shifted to the Eastern stage. It was hoped that Britain would be able to gain victories here to off-set Germany’s conquests in Europe, and the jump-off points for periperal war. It was not believed that peace could be achieved before 1919. When, therefore, Britain tumbled into peace in 1918, policies had been undertaken in the East which were to have profound consequences.