Since 1798, when Congress authorised John Adams to employ the navy to capture armed French vessels preying on American shipping along the Atlantic coast, US presidents have grappled with the complexities of war. Some have dealt with it skilfully while others have tended towards the inept. Some have wanted to exert their war powers while others have shied away from them. Some have been successful while others have not. Never having had their authority clearly defined, the presidents, as commanders in chief, have been allowed to interpret the scope of their involvement in wartime decision-making. The question of whether a president can order forces into combat against another nation has never been resolved and precedent supports both sides.
Essentially, says Raymond O'Connor,
the president can do whatever he can get away with.

Commanders in Chief
offering an enlightening look at the president’s constitutional and political roles during wartime, brings together the work of several prominent historians. These experts analyse the war powers of the presidency as well as the wartime leadership of six presidents - William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. Two of the authors take provocative revisionist views of their subjects. Lewis Gould asserts that McKinley delivered able and talented leadership during the Spanish-American War, while Robert Ferrell sharply criticises Wilson’s leadership during World War I. On the other hand, Warren Kimball emphatically confirms the high ranking by most scholars of Roosevelt as the most gifted wartime chief executive of the 20th century, and Clayton James substantiates Truman’s strong and pragmatic leadership in two conflicts. In Frank Vandiver’s essay on Johnson, and Stephen Ambrose’s on Nixon, the authors emphasise the diversity of challenges the two presidents faced during the controversial Vietnam War. Revising and updating earlier studies, including
The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief , the 1960 collection edited by Ernest May, this book offers a thoughtful critique of the character and capabilities of America’s modern commanders in chief.