High Command: Australia’s Struggle for an Independent War Strategy, 1939-1945

Since it was first published in 1982, High Command had become the standard reference for anyone interested in Australia’s participation in the Second World War, this edition was originally published in 1992. The 50th anniversary of battles such as Singapore, Coral Sea and Kokoda in 1942 re-awakened interest in these milestones in Australia’s struggle for independence. Despite the well-known exploits of Australian servicemen in a score of famous battles, Australia’s contribution to the war was ultimately determined by the strategic policy-makers in Canberra, Washington and London.

How competent were our politicians, military leaders and advisers in formulating our own war strategy? How much did the performance of Australian troops on the battlefield affect our ability to influence allied strategy?

The author describes the clash between Generals Rowell and Blamey in Greece. He reveals the impact of the secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, on strategic policy-making. He analyses the role of intelligence, especially signals intelligence, in allied strategy. He shows how Blamey’s miscalculation in 1944 removed any chance of Australian troops joining the Americans in the Philippines. And he reveals how a British admiral challenged the authority of the Australian government.

High Command presents the remarkable, full story of the political battles behind the military battles.