National Security Decisionmaking: The Israeli Case

The study of national security decisionmaking is fraught with pitfalls. This statement holds true for any researcher, but all the more so for someone like this author, who has been actively engaged for many years in national security decisionmaking, at times at the highest levels. From the outset, I have been aware of the dangers of subjectivism, of injecting my own political attitudes and opinions, preconceived notions and biases into the material, the analyses and especially the conclusions and recommendations. I have endeavored, to the best of my ability, to undertake this research with the disinterested curiosity and objective neutrality which should be the hallmark of a good scientist and researcher. But no one can be totally disinterested in a process which has a direct bearing on his life and well-being; thus the only guarantee of the objectivity of such a work is the constant recognition and awareness of the danger of going astray, the advice and criticism of one’s colleagues and, in the final analysis, one’s own conscience.