Become a Readings Member to make your shopping experience even easier. Sign in or sign up for free!

Become a Readings Member. Sign in or sign up for free!

Hello Readings Member! Go to the member centre to view your orders, change your details, or view your lists, or sign out.

Hello Readings Member! Go to the member centre or sign out.

Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements
Hardback

Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

$307.99
Sign in or become a Readings Member to add this title to your wishlist.

Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false.Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory but that this is not a problem for the theory. Instead, he argues, it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory.He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory’s truth and our ability to believe it.

Read More
In Shop
Out of stock
Shipping & Delivery

$9.00 standard shipping within Australia
FREE standard shipping within Australia for orders over $100.00
Express & International shipping calculated at checkout

MORE INFO
Format
Hardback
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Country
United Kingdom
Date
31 August 2017
Pages
242
ISBN
9780198785897

Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false.Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory but that this is not a problem for the theory. Instead, he argues, it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory.He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory’s truth and our ability to believe it.

Read More
Format
Hardback
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Country
United Kingdom
Date
31 August 2017
Pages
242
ISBN
9780198785897