Consent, in its relation to sexuality, is struggling to establish itself as the key word in the exercise of a free sexual life. Caught between tradition and modernity, individual order and social order, permission and exclusion, consent is at the heart of the repression of sexual offences of the first order. The promotion of legal morality in the use of sexuality restricts any disposition of the body when the acts to be performed do not fall within what qualifies as good sexuality instituted by the social body. This good sexuality imposes a norm of sexual governance thus becoming the reference. Also, this hardening of sexual freedom by the Cameroonian legislator, assimilated to paternalism, would be justified in addition to moral considerations by a sociology of sexual offenses that tend to increase the phenomenon of victimology within society. Notwithstanding this, is this ratio legis sufficient for the ineligibility of consent as a justification due to the nature of the law in question?