In various instances, countries, regional organizations, and the United Nations have resorted to the use of sanctions as a foreign policy and as a tool for geopolitics, in order to influence the behavior of targeted states. Numerous researches and analyses have been conducted to observe and understand the effectiveness and impact of sanctions, and subsequently dismissed them as either effective, ineffective, or counterproductive to their intended objectives. This study seeks to address the aforementioned question; in particular, whether sanctions remain to be an option as a geopolitical tool to influence the behavior of targeted states. The core of this work consists of three case studies: first, sanctions on the Russian Federation (2014-present); sanctions on Iran (1979 -present, 2006, 2012 -2016); and the US trade embargo on Cuba (1960 -present). These case studies have been analyzed from the structural point of view to understand their specifics, background, and plausible retaliation by the respective state. Then, the technical results achieved by the sanctions are reviewed, and their weaknesses are highlighted. Lastly, numerous relevant arguments are provided to reinforce the conclusion.