The dramatic events of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan make an obvious case for expert study of the George W. Bush defense program. Such an assessment requires nonpartisan detachment but not disengagement from the seriousness of the issues at hand. The rise and fall of governments, the fates of people, and the very definitions of ‘war’ and ‘victory’ were up for discussion in the Bush years. The United States, with its unprecedented global military power at the dawn of the twenty-first century, created new opportunities for using foreign policy and military strategy on behalf of national and allied interests. But this power was limited, and its use against unconventional or otherwise unorthodox enemies required careful calibration of its various instruments. In this book, Bush’s defense program is appraised from various standpoints by eleven academic experts, many of whom have past or current experience in the U.S. government or the American armed forces and are prominent in the defense and security think tank communities. They examine Bush’s defense policy and strategy across a variety of issues, including Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, nuclear arms control, and foreign military sales. In addition, special chapters are devoted to the leadership style of former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to the idea of ‘victory’ as it might apply to Bush’s defense decisions, and to the best exit strategy for the United States from Iraq. The lessons learned from the successes and failures in Bush’s defense policy can also be applied to the appraisal of past and future presidents.