Stalin fabricated the myth that the Germans carried out the Katyn massacre and the West accepted it while always suspecting the reality. In the same way, each country tried to forget the more painful memories of its past and construct its own mythology. The Germans were never taken to task at Nuremberg for bombing because the Anglo-Americans virtually carried out a war of annihilation. The French Gaullist myth was that it was decadent politicians who caused the defeat, and that fighting France freed itself. In a similar vein, the Italian resistance was fostered as a myth and used postwar to cover the fascist period of their history. British and American popular history tends to portray their countries as the main victors often ignoring the massive Russian contribution, and generally concentrates on the barbarity of the Eastern war. Much is forgotten and much enhanced; both incidents and leaders. The Italian military historian of this book writes in depth about the Italian war so often ignored in western history, and tackles the myth of Italian cowardice, while the British author takes a cold, calculated look at Anglo-American leaders such as Montgomery, Mountbatten, Clark, Patton, and questions the myth of the special relationship between Great Britain and the USA, as well as the official and unofficial amnesia relating to self-inflicted gas wounds in Italy.