This book discusses the issue of limited stakeholder recognition and protection of stakeholder interests within the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model practised in many Sub-Saharan African countries.

The volume argues that the relative success of the Anglo-Saxon model in developed economies is attributed to the presence of functional institutions, such as effective legal systems, active external markets for corporate control, and organized civil societies, among others. Many African countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, have adopted the UK corporate governance framework despite facing challenges occasioned by an inefficient legal system plagued by systemic corruption. Given the challenging institutional contexts in African countries, this book proposes an alternative corporate governance framework - the Functional Stakeholders Model (FSM) - for the banking industry in countries facing similar institutional challenges; the FSM aims to promote stakeholder recognition and the protection of stakeholders interests. The book draws on stakeholder and institutional theories in designing an alternative corporate governance model, the 'FSM' for banks operating in challenging institutional contexts.

The book will interest regulators, bankers, auditors, academia, policymakers, and researchers in comparative corporate governance and financial regulation, especially banking regulation and stakeholders in developing and emerging markets.