This collection of original essays offers a comprehensive examination of scientific progress, which has been a central topic in recent debates in philosophy of science.

Traditionally, debates concerning scientific progress have focused on different methodological approaches, notably the epistemic and semantic approaches. The chapters in Part I of the book defend these two traditional approaches, as well as the newly revived functional and newly developed understanding-based approaches. Part II features in-depth case studies of scientific progress from the history of science. The chapters cover individual sciences including physics, chemistry, evolutionary biology, seismology, psychology, sociology, economics, and medicine. Finally, Part III of the book explores important issues from contemporary philosophy of science. These chapters address the implications of scientific progress for the scientific realism/anti-realism debate, incommensurability, values in science, idealisation, scientific speculation, interdisciplinarity, and scientific perspectivalism.

New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on the history and philosophy of science.