NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT–OVERSTOCK SALE – Significantly reduced list price

This second of three volumes on the history of operations research identifies, describes, and evaluates the ideas, people, organizations, and events that influenced the development of ORSA in the Army from the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 to the withdrawal of U.S.T

The last official campaign of the UnitedStates Army in Vietnam ended on 28January 1973. By that date most Armycombat units and advisers had been withdrawn fromSouth Vietnam, leaving only a small contingent ofcombat support and combat service support troopswho were soon redeployed to the United States. Thusended one of the most eventful eras in U.S. militaryhistory. Indeed, the period from 1961 to 1973 wasa tumultuous era in world history, an era marked byworldwide political upheaval, growing distrust ofgovernment, and alienation of the young from the hitherto accepted standards and values of political, economic, social, and cultural behavior. The 1960sand early 1970s were also a time of great growth andchange in the Army analytical community, a time inwhich Army operations research and systems analysis(ORSA) managers and analysts faced a numberof difficult challenges. The McNamara revolutionin defense management emphasized quantitativemethods and systematic analysis, and the evergrowing complexities of structuring military forces forthe future as well as the problems of fighting a longwar in Southeast Asia summoned a maximum effortfrom Army analysts.

The use of ORSA techniquesexpanded into new areas, such as management andforce planning. The reliance on one or two primaryArmy ORSA contractors was abandoned in favor of awider range of private contractors and greater relianceon in-house Army ORSA organizations that grewsubstantially. The increased demand for trained ORSAmanagers and analysts prompted a number of studiesthat focused on the Army s need for systematic analysisand ORSA personnel. As a result, a professionalprogram for the selection, training, and utilization ofArmy officer ORSA specialists was introduced, andmeasures were taken to improve the preparation andutilization of the Army s civilian analysts as well. Theuse of ORSA methods became a generally acceptedpart of the research and development and combatdevelopment processes, and Army ORSA analystsparticipated in the major studies of the day, particularlythose dealing with the two most prominent military issues of the 1960s, counterinsurgency and airmobility, and applied their skills to solve the practical problemsencountered in the war against the Communists inSoutheast Asia.forces from Vietnam in 1973.

Related products: History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. I: 1942-62 – Print Paperback format –can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00433-0 History of Operations Research in the United States Army, V. 3, 1973-1995 –Print Paperback format – can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00473-9