As a former negotiator, I wish I had had the benefit of Profssor Rose’s insights and I am confident that future U.S. negotiators will profit from them.

Paul C. Warnke, Former Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The first systematic appraisal of the utility of unilateral initiatives in arms control, this study combines theory and case studies to provide important insights and implications for U.S. policy.

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University

I consider Dr. Rose’s book to be a very significant contribution to the field. The topic–unilateral arms control initiatives–is one that has drawn sporadic attention in the past, but I know of no better analysis of this important topic than Dr. Rose’s.

Dan Caldwell, Pepperdine University

The question has been continuously debated since the 1950s: Should unilateral arms control initiatives be treated as essential steps toward world peace or as the product of wishful thinking that is in fact dangerous to our national security? Rose explores the problem through an analysis of Soviet responses to past American initiatives, where the U.S. exercised restraint in weapons testing, production, or deployment in attempts to obtain reciprocal Soviet restraint. In comparative case studies of six U.S. arms initiatives–some of which succeeded and some of which failed–he tests and evaluates a series of hypotheses about the conditions that may favor the success of such initiatives.

After outlining the major features of the arms control controversy, Rose surveys the theoretical literature to identify factors that may favor successful initiatives. These include aspects of the bargaining process; cost-benefit calculations about the military, political, and economic consequences of reciprocating an initiative; and other elements in the domestic and international environment that may effect the outcome of bargaining. The factors that are influenced by the domestic nature or international situation of the Soviet Union are examined in detail.